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Background: Situations of humanitarian crisis are often caused by armed conflicts. Given the prevalence of
non-international armed conflicts today, ways of ameliorating these situations are at the forefront of concerns. The
international humanitarian law rules governing non-international armed conflict remain much less developed than
those for international armed conflicts. This makes governing the behaviour of non-state parties to non-international
armed conflicts (non-state armed groups) extremely challenging. This is exacerbated by the lack of direct human rights
obligations for non-state armed groups. Although several initiatives have been taken to encourage non-state actors to
mitigate situations of humanitarian crisis, the role of human rights law is somewhat under-developed in this respect.
Method: The paper aims to assess what role human rights may have in improving humanitarian crises, suggesting one
specific way in which they may be used. In order to achieve this, the paper will first discuss the international laws
applicable to situations of non-international armed conflict. The paper will then critically analyse some of the initiatives
that have already been taken to mitigate the disparity in human rights protection during armed conflicts.
Results: Based on the findings of this analysis, a new measure—the possibility of using a ceasefire agreement to
impose specific human rights obligations on all parties to a conflict—will be assessed.
Conclusions: An evaluation of the merits and challenges raised by this suggestion will lead to a conclusion as to the
role that human rights and ceasefire agreements could have during humanitarian crises.
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The non-international armed conflict in Syria has been pro-
claimed as causing the “biggest humanitarian emergency in
our era” (Peralta 2014). The combination of a repressive re-
gime, armed opposition groups and terrorist activities has
left the country in a constant state of instability and chaos.
Millions of people have been forced to live in abject condi-
tions, without access to basic living supplies such as food,
water and shelter. The ongoing grapple for power between
the Islamic State and the Syrian government exacerbates
the already dire situation. This paper will assess the poten-
tial role of ceasefire agreements in imposing human rights
obligations for non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in efforts
to ameliorate situations of humanitarian crisis caused by
non-international armed conflicts. The ultimate aim of theCorrespondence: c.l.lane@rug.nl
University of Groningen, Oude Kijk in ‘t Jastraat 26, 9712 EK, Groningen, The
Netherlands
© 2016 Lane. Open Access This article is distri
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b
medium, provided you give appropriate credit
license, and indicate if changes were made.paper is to build upon existing literature to suggest a way in
which the inapplicability of human rights law to non-state
armed groups could be circumvented during situations of
humanitarian crisis in non-international armed conflicts
(NIAC). The research question posed in this paper differs
somewhat from the existing literature concerning the appli-
cation of human rights law to NSAGs as it ties this discus-
sion to the issue of humanitarian assistance.
Method
The paper will first discuss the international law applic-
able to situations of non-international armed conflict.
This will involve a brief explanation of the doctrine of
lex specialis, necessary for identifying the applicable law
during non-international armed conflicts, and the stan-
dards to which parties to the conflict may be held. The
analysis will then focus on economic, social and cultural
rights, as the most relevant for improving access to food,
water and shelter. The section aims to demonstrate thebuted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
y/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
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by the lack of direct human rights obligations for armed
opposition groups. The next section of the paper will
critically analyse some of the initiatives that have already
been taken to improve inadequate human rights protec-
tion during armed conflicts, made worse by the differ-
ences in human rights obligations between non-state
and state parties to a conflict. Based on the findings of
this analysis, a new measure—the possibility of using a
ceasefire agreement to impose specific human rights ob-
ligations on all parties to a conflict—will then be
assessed. This will include an evaluation of the merits
and challenges raised by this suggestion, leading to a
conclusion as to the role that human rights and ceasefire
agreements could have during humanitarian crises.
Results
Applicable rules of international law
The laws applicable to armed conflicts are extremely
well rehearsed (Solis 2010; Clapham and Gaeta 2014)
and will be only briefly laid out below. The following
section will focus on non-international armed conflicts
taking place between a state and (one or more) non-
state armed group. For the purposes of the paper, the
term ‘non-state armed group’ shall refer to a definition
of a non-state actor as suggested by Geneva Call. It shall
therefore include “any armed group, distinct from and not
operating under the control of, the state or states in which
it carries out military operations, and which has political,
religious, and/or military objectives” (Bellal et al. 2011, 48).1
Applicability of international humanitarian law
The corpus of international humanitarian law applicable
during NIAC is somewhat limited compared to that re-
lating to international armed conflicts. In the early days
of international law, the lack of development was per-
haps due to a general understanding that because of its
domestic nature, internal warfare fell within the scope of
states’ national jurisdiction and need not be regulated
internationally (Moir 2002, 2). Although some customary
international law pertaining to NIAC existed (relating par-
ticularly to the recognition of belligerency), state practice
on the matter rapidly declined (Moir 1998, 352). However,
as the prevalence of internal conflicts grew, and the trans-
national effects of NIAC became more evident (e.g. the
influx of refugees and/or a ‘spill-over’ of hostilities to
neighbouring states: Moir 2002, 2) and the realisation that
parties most affected by conflicts (i.e. civilians) were in
need of protection regardless of the nature of the conflict,
the mid-twentieth century brought a greater acceptance of
the application of humanitarian norms to NIAC. None-
theless, despite efforts of the International Committee of
the Red Cross to encourage the application in practice
(having adopted a resolution on the matter in 1938: Moir1998, 354), progress was stopped short by the breakout of
World War II. It was therefore not until 1949, after a re-
jection of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC)’s attempts to have the totality of international hu-
manitarian law extended to cover NIAC, that the some-
what restrictive Common Article 3 to the universally
binding Geneva Conventions (Best 1994, 82–83; ICRC
1949a; ICRC 1949b; ICRC 1948c; ICRC 1949d) was
adopted.2 The NIAC-specific Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC 1977) was
later hastily adopted in 1977, after further disagreements be-
tween states as to the extent to which their internal affairs
should be opened to external scrutiny (see Best, 346–347).
The standards contained in these instruments apply to
both state and non-state parties to a NIAC. This asser-
tion has raised several conceptual concerns, perhaps the
most notable relating to the legitimacy of applying treaty
standards to NSAGs, who have not ratified the relevant
treaties. At the international level, in the absence of an
elected world government, the legitimacy of obligations
stems from the sovereign equality of states and the fact
that they bind only themselves through the creation and
adoption of international norms. The source of legitim-
acy for the imposition of direct obligations on non-state
actors at the international level without their participa-
tion therefore raises some questions. Justifications prof-
fered range from the ‘doctrine of state jurisdiction’3 to
the analogy of individual criminal responsibility.4 Per-
haps the most persuasive justification is the argument
that some procedural requirements of legitimacy need
not be followed in relation to norms preventing heinous
conduct. It has been argued, for example, that if the ex-
pected result of the obligations’ implementation is of
paramount importance, it may negate the necessity of
the norms being adopted with the consent of affected
parties (Ryngaert 2010, 71–73). Ryngaert asserts that in
the absence of participation by a non-state actor, if a
“legal norm or its implementation has in itself an im-
portant substantive value”, participation is not necessary
(Ryngaert 2010, 71). Arguably, in the case of inter-
national humanitarian law that was extended to NIAC
primarily for the purpose of protecting civilians, this ar-
gument rings true. Indeed, “it has now become uncon-
troversial…that [NSAGs] are bound by international
humanitarian law” (Bellal et al. 2011, 56).
However, a high threshold must be met for Additional
Protocol II to be applicable.5 This means that in many
situations, only Common Article 3 providing minimal
protections would apply, as the provision automatically
applies upon the classification of a situation as a non-
international armed conflict. By now, however, this body
of law has matured, with a more expansive corpus of
customary international humanitarian law applying to
NIAC (Sivakumaran 2012, 102). Notwithstanding criti-
cism of this customary law, its application to NSAGs has
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treaty-based rules (Bellal et al. 2011, 56).
In addition, the assertion that some rules of inter-
national armed conflicts are also applicable in NIACs is
becoming more commonplace (Columbia Law School
Human Rights Institute, cited in Cleveland 2014). These
evolutions in the law of NIACs have taken place pre-
dominantly to counter concerns that despite the wide-
spread nature of NIACs, the laws applicable during an
international armed conflict were much more extensive
in scope. Until the 1990s, developing the rules of NIAC
beyond those provided for by Geneva law was “never
seriously entertained” (Sivakumaran 2012, 55). With the
majority of armed conflicts currently occurring world-
wide being non-international in nature (Armed Conflict
2014),6 the developments are now a welcome opportun-
ity to mitigate the human suffering caused by armed
conflicts and thwart concerns regarding the deregulation
of NIACs.7
Now that the law applicable during NIAC is in a more
(though by no means fully) developed state, the primary
issue to be addressed is how to ensure that NSAGs com-
ply with the relevant norms and close the gap between
law and practice during NIAC. Aligning the practice of
NSAGs with the legal standards is an extremely challen-
ging task, however. On the one hand, NSAGs may not
be aware of the existence or meaning of humanitarian
norms and may lack the institutional structure to ensure
compliance of their own fighters (Ryngaert and Van de
Meulebroucke 2012, 456–457). Alternatively, a NSAG
may be unwilling to engage with the notion that it has
legal obligations under humanitarian law (e.g. ICRC
2008). Even those NSAGs willing to abide by the laws
may encounter an array of obstacles in implementing
them.8 It is for this reason that organisations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross have engaged
with NSAGs that have expressed a desire for help.
Nonetheless, as Ryngaert and Van de Meulebroucke
note, unlike for states, there is no formal advisory ser-
vice available to NSAGs struggling to comply (Ryngaert
and Van de Meulebroucke 2012, 457).
Notwithstanding the difficulties faced in ensuring
NSAGs’ compliance with humanitarian law, there is
growing support for the application of international hu-
man rights law to situations of armed conflict, which will
be explained in the following section.
Applicability of international human rights law
The rhetoric pertaining to the application of inter-
national human rights law to armed conflicts was ini-
tially somewhat divergent. A major focus of this debate
has revolved around the doctrine of lex specialis derogat
legi generali (lex specialis), which many believed to ren-
der the application of human rights during armedconflicts inappropriate (e.g. Schabas 2007, 594). As the lit-
erature engaging with this debate is extremely extensive,
this section will present a summary of the doctrine and its
consequences within the context of this paper. The doc-
trine mandates that more precise and specialised law is to
take precedence over more general laws. Reluctance to
apply human rights law during armed conflicts was also
due to the differing natures and ‘roots’ of humanitarian
and human rights law (Solis 2010, 24). On the one hand,
humanitarian law (not seeking to abolish conflict) does
not prohibit the immediate killing of the enemy. It seeks
rather to diminish the devastating human cost of conflicts
and to ensure a fairer fight (ICRC 2004).9 Human rights
law, on the other hand, seeks to protect individuals from
potentially abusive actions by states and does not allow
the arbitrary taking of life under any circumstances.10
Furthermore, as is explained below, human rights law
imposes obligations on the state for the benefit of indi-
viduals. The relationship between the obligation-holder
and the beneficiaries (or rights-holder) is thus inherently
vertical in nature. In contrast, as explained above, many
humanitarian obligations are owed by all parties to the
conflict, which act essentially as mutual beneficiaries
(assuming that all parties comply with their obligations).
In more recent years, the international community has
increasingly accepted the view of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory
that during armed conflicts international humanitarian
norms and international human rights norms may apply
simultaneously, in a complementary manner (Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 2004, para 106). It
may be said, therefore, that the doctrine of lex specialis
serves more to determine the precise rules to apply to a
particular situation, rather than precluding application of
one body of law. This view is supported by Marko Milano-
vić, who has highlighted that understanding the doctrine
as being generally applicable to the human rights and hu-
manitarian regimes as a whole, is mistaken (Milanović
2011, 98–101). Following Kreiger, Milanović’s suggestion is
to assess which rule constitutes the lex specialis by looking
at the relationship between specific norms, rather than re-
gimes as a whole (Milanović 2011, citing Kreiger 2006).
The present paper will also depart from this starting point,
understanding the lex specialis during situations of hu-
manitarian crisis as being human rights law.
Economic, social and cultural rights
Having established that international human rights law
as such may be applicable during non-international
armed conflicts, the following section will address the
application of economic, social and cultural rights. The
rights usually forming the subject of debates concerning
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itical rights, such as the right to life and the prohibition
of torture. This is perhaps due to the existence of con-
crete norms in humanitarian law which also provide
rules on the use of torture and the taking of life,11 al-
though they differ from human rights law. However, the
rights affected (and applicable) during armed conflicts
are not limited to those whose subject matter is also
dealt with by norms under humanitarian law. When
concerned with humanitarian crises that result in
heavily reduced access to materials and services essen-
tial to a life of dignity, often referred to as ‘subsistence
rights’ (such as healthcare, food, and water and sanita-
tion), economic, social and cultural rights are of the
utmost relevance.
It may well be argued that in relation to the provision
of food and water during armed conflicts, human rights
law constitutes the lex specialis. As implied above, deci-
phering which norm/s form the lex specialis in a given
circumstance will require an examination of which norms
are the most developed. In the present context of subsist-
ence rights, human rights law has not only been given
more content than the relevant humanitarian law norms
but also provides (in theory) more extensive protection of
access to essential materials and services.
For example, humanitarian law rules do prohibit the use
of starvation as a method of warfare and the targeting of
essential resources (being classed as civilian objects),12
thereby providing limited protection of materials. The
rules on access to humanitarian aid are more developed
for international armed conflicts. For non-international
armed conflicts, however, the applicable treaty rules do
not explicitly refer to humanitarian aid (Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs 2011, 25–26). Regardless,
the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs has inter-
preted Common Article 3 to include a principle that civil-
ian populations may not be intentionally subjected to
situations that would, due to a lack of access to essential
supplies, threaten their dignity or result in “serious mental
or physical suffering” (Swiss Federal Department of
Foreign Affairs 2011, 26). However, these rules are con-
structed as ‘negative’ obligations—prohibitions of certain
conduct requiring parties to refrain from interfering with
access to essential supplies. Whilst the same obligations
can be found under economic, social and cultural rights,
human rights law goes further, requiring states parties to
not only respect the rights (i.e. refrain from interfering
with their enjoyment) but also protect and fulfil the rights
by providing the means and/or substance for the right to
be effectively realised (Shue 1980, 260; Eide 1987).13
In addition, the rule in Common Article 3 relating to
the lack of access to essential supplies is not buttressed
by a wider range of provisions applicable during NIAC.
Indeed, humanitarian assistance (i.e. the provision offood, water and healthcare) as such is scarcely regulated
during NIAC, which may raise a presumption that hu-
man rights law constitutes the lex specialis. Provisions
regulating humanitarian assistance during international
armed conflicts can be found in (for example) Article 23
Geneva Convention IV and Article 70 Additional Protocol
I (see ICRC, 2014). However, other provisions relating to
humanitarian assistance during NIAC are limited to
Article 18 Additional Protocol II. This article provides for
the undertaking of humanitarian “relief actions” (with the
consent of the concerned state party) in the event that the
“civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a
lack of the supplies essential for its survival” (Article 18,
para 2). The very vagueness of this protection, extending
to “foodstuffs and medical supplies” suggests that the
much more embellished human rights law would offer
more protection of subsistence rights than humanitarian
law. It may be argued that the Manual on the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict 2006 (the San Remo
Manual) provides further detail in this respect. The
manual is a restatement of the law applicable during
NIAC, though like the ICRC codifications of law, it
is not legally binding. Chapter 5 of the Manual states
that “humanitarian assistance should be allowed and
facilitated by those engaged in military operations
whenever essential needs in an emergency are not
being met” and provides more information on the
definition of humanitarian assistance. The Manual
still refrains from placing positive obligations on par-
ties to the conflict to ensure that the essential needs
are, in fact, met. Taken together with the lack of more de-
tailed information on what constitutes essential foodstuffs
etc., this contributed to the argument that the lex specialis
in the present context is human rights law.
Further support for the argument that human rights
law constitutes the lex specialis in relation to a humani-
tarian crisis caused by a NIAC may be found in the non-
limitation and non-derogability of subsistence rights in
such a situation. The implications of these two aspects
of subsistence rights and the nature of the obligations
deriving from them, as economic, social and cultural
rights, will now be explained.
Limited application of economic, social and cultural rights
A. Legitimate limitations of human rightsDespite the general applicability of economic, social
and cultural rights in times of armed conflict, there
are measures which states may take to restrict the
scope of their obligations. These consist primarily of
derogations and limitations of the rights. However,
as Müller (2009) has suggested, the legitimacy of
invoking these methods during an armed conflict is,
at least regarding the abovementioned subsistence
rights, questionable.14
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cultural rights are allowed under Article 4 of the
International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) for the promotion of the
general welfare in a democratic society, providing
that they are not contrary to the nature of the right.
This sole reason justifying limitations is more
restrictive than the several reasons found in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1966a (ICCPR). Article 19 ICCPR on freedom of
expression, for example, allows limitations for
several reasons, including the respect of the rights
or reputation of others, the promotion of national
security or pubic order, or of public health or
morals. Müller has persuasively argued that this
reason effectively means that states may not limit
the ‘minimum core’ of economic, social and cultural
rights, since they would go against the nature of the
rights (Müller 2009, 575).15 In addition to these
requirements, limitations to economic, social and
cultural rights must be prescribed by law,
proportionate to the aim pursued, and necessary in a
democratic society. Furthermore, as the Limburg
Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
state, “[article 4] was not meant to introduce
limitations on rights affecting the subsistence…of the
person.” (United Nations Commission on Human
Rights 1987, para 47). Taken together with the nature
of subsistence rights as providing for the basic
necessities required for human existence, it can
therefore be inferred that limitations to subsistence
rights would not be considered legitimate.
B. Derogations from economic, social and cultural rights
The question of whether state parties may derogate
from economic, social and cultural rights in times of
public emergency has been a matter of much debate.
Derogating from a right essentially allows states to
put their obligations on hold for a specified period
of time. As derogating is a somewhat extreme
measure, whether or not a particular right may be
derogated from, and under which circumstances, is
usually laid down in the text of a human rights
treaty. However, this is not the case for the ICESCR,
which neither contains a derogation clause allowing
for derogations, nor a provision prohibiting
derogations. This is unlike the ICCPR, Article 4 of
which specifies the conditions for derogations from
its provisions, and prohibits derogations from
several rights (Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2,
respectively). Nonetheless, the fact that there is no
derogation clause in ICESCR does not necessarily
mean that states would be precluded from
derogating from them.However, it can be inferred from the purpose of
derogation clauses that at least some economic,
social and cultural rights are non-derogable.
According to Müller, this would extend to
subsistence rights (Müller 2009, 593). The purpose
of derogations is not to allow states to decrease their
attention to the rights, but (following the criteria of
Article 4 ICCPR) must be to ensure that the state is
in a position where it is capable of ensuring human
rights and to restore a situation of normalcy (United
Nations Human Rights Committee 2001, para 1).
This is evident from the requirement that a state be
in a “time of public emergency that threatens the life
of the nation” before it may make derogations.
Whilst it may be true that a non-international
armed conflict may cause such a situation of public
emergency, it cannot reasonably be expected that
derogating from rights such as the right to food, water
and healthcare, could help to restore the state to a
situation of normalcy. On the contrary, reducing
access to essential resources would aggravate, rather
than ameliorate, a situation of public emergency.
Allan Rosas and Monika Sandvik-Nylund have also
suggested that the relationship between subsistence
rights and the right to life can contribute to the
argument in favour of the non-derogability of
subsistence rights (Rosas and Sandvik-Nylund, 2001,
414). Subsistence rights are of the utmost importance
for the protection of human dignity and survival in
emergency situations and are interrelated with the
right to life—a non-derogable right (to the extent that
a life may not be arbitrarily taken) (see Müller 2009,
599). This view is supported by several human rights
bodies which, lacking jurisdiction over (or the
justiciability of) economic, social and cultural rights,
have interpreted the right to life to include subsistence
rights. For example, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has repeatedly read the right to life
(protected by Article 4 of the American Convention
on Human Rights) to include healthcare as one of
its essential attributes (see Case of Children´s
Rehabilitation v. Paraguay 1999). This reading is
now “solidly part” of the Court’s jurisprudence,
having been embellished upon in several cases
(e.g. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay 2006, discussed in Melish 2008, 389).
C. The nature of ESCR
Whether or not the manner of using the right to life
in this way is found to be persuasive for present
purposes, the fact that Article 2(1) ICESCR allows
economic, social and cultural rights to be
progressively realised is also of relevance here.16
The provision means that whilst some immediate
measures have to be taken by states to contribute to
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their full realisation is not an immediate obligation.
States must, however, make continuous and
progressive measures to increase the realisation of the
rights, depending on their available resources. Whilst it
may be argued that a state has less resources available
during armed conflicts, which would naturally lead to a
lesser degree of the rights’ realisation, the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has
introduced a concept of ‘minimum core obligations’ of
the Covenant rights (CESCR 1990, para 10). Simply
speaking, this means that there is a certain floor of
human rights realisation that states must ensure,
regardless of their particular domestic situation. In
relation to the rights to food, water, and highest
attainable standard of health, which have been given
more content through CESCR’s General Comments
12, 15 and 14, respectively, the minimum core would
arguably provide more protection of subsistence rights
than the norms under humanitarian law, despite their
progressive nature.
In addition, the Committee has suggested that the
notion of progressive realisation makes it extremely
cumbersome for states to justify any retrogressive
measures.17 The extent to which this would also hold
true during armed conflicts, during which time
resources may need to be redistributed, is unclear.
However, it may be deduced that at least the minimum
core of subsistence rights may not be derogated from,
even during situations of public emergency threatening
the life of the nation. This conclusion is particularly
significant when viewed in light of the below discussion
on the absence of human rights obligations for NSAGs.
If subsistence rights were derogable, it would mean that
the obligations on the state and NSAGs would be more
equal and would provide some level of justification for
the fact that individuals’ rights were not being realised.The above discussion demonstrates that the more
embellished standards relating to the provision of food,
water and healthcare found within international hu-
man rights law makes these norms, rather than those
found in humanitarian law, the lex specialis in the
present context. This finding is strengthened by the
conclusion that subsistence rights are non-derogable
and may not be limited during NIAC. Unfortunately,
whilst this affords perhaps more protection to individ-
uals within territory controlled by a state, it leaves in-
dividuals in areas controlled by NSAGs (as non-human
rights obligations-holders) without human rights pro-
tection. This problem and efforts to use human rights
law to remedy the gap in protection through the indir-
ect application of human rights obligations to NSAGs
will now be assessed.NSAGs and the indirect horizontal effect of human rights
Under the current international human rights framework,
NSAGs do not have direct human rights obligations; as
non-state actors, NSAGs cannot be party to international
human rights treaties. Rather, human rights obligations are
vertical in nature, being owed by the state on a vertically su-
perior legal plane, to individuals. Unlike other international
treaties, human rights treaties do not even have horizontal
application, or ‘horizontal effect’ between states. Human
rights treaties allow for neither substantive horizontal effect
(i.e. allowing individuals to claim violations of actual rights
owed to them by NSA), nor procedural horizontal effect,
often known as drittwirkung18 (reflected in the rule that
complaints of human rights violations may only be brought
before the human rights treaty bodies by individuals against
states) (e.g. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights 1966c, Article 1).
However, the ever-increasing power and influence of
non-state actors (including NSAGs) and their ability to
interfere with the enjoyment of human rights has led to
an application of ‘indirect horizontal effect’ by many hu-
man rights monitoring bodies and courts. Although being
achieved through several different methods, indirect hori-
zontal effect essentially holds states responsible for human
rights interference resulting from the conduct of non-
state actors. In the past, this has been used in relation to
corporations, NSAGs, and even individuals (e.g. European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Fadeyeva v. Russia 2005;
United Nations Committee against Torture Sadiq Shek
Elmi v. Australia 1999; ECtHR, X and Y v. The
Netherlands 1985). Perhaps the most prevalent way of
achieving indirect horizontal effect is to use states’ positive
obligation to protect individuals from human rights inter-
ference with the enjoyment of their rights.
The obligation has been fleshed out using a ‘duty of due
diligence’. Under international human rights law, this
means that states must take all appropriate measures to
‘prevent, investigate and punish’ third party interference
with human rights enjoyment (Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras 1988,
paras 79, 172). When assessing whether or not a state has
acted with due diligence, the focus is on the conduct, and
the progressive measures that states took in a particular
situation, rather than the result of the measures and whether
or not they were actually successful in protecting an individ-
ual (Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights 2005, 61). In practice, this means that a state
will not be expected to protect every individual all of the
time. Rather, they will be expected to take protective mea-
sures when they know, or should have known, of a threat to
an individual’s rights by a third party (see, e.g. ECtHR,
Osman v. United Kingdom 1998b; ECtHR, Z and Others v.
United Kingdom 2001, ECtHR Kaya v Turkey 1998a).
Whereas this is arguably more reasonable for states, it
has obvious flaws in relation to non-state actors outside
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is that of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. The non-international
armed conflict between the NSAG and the state has
been taking place for over 50 years, with the FARC hav-
ing gained in 2000 effective control over a large area of
Colombian territory (Rollins 2010, 18). The Human
Rights Council has expressed concern at the lack of
inquiry and investigation into crimes committed by
demobilised individuals from the FARC against women
and children, in particular the recruitment of child sol-
diers (Human Rights Council, Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review 2008, para 57).
This would also presumably fail to comply with the
state’s obligation under Article 4(2) of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000) to
“take all feasible measures” to ensure that the relevant
norms are respected. The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights emphasised the importance of the ob-
ligation to investigate and punish actions by NSA in its
assessment of whether Colombia had acted with due
diligence in relation to FARC activity, but ultimately
stated that “in situations of civil strife, the State cannot
always prevent, much less be held responsible for, the
harm to individuals and destruction of private property
occasioned by the hostile acts of its armed opponents.”
(Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Organization of American States 1999, Chapter IV para 4,
discussed in Clapham 2006b, 422). This appears to place a
lower (albeit more realistic) burden on states than the
European Court of Human Rights. In the case of Illascu
and others v. Moldova and Russia (1999), the Court was
called upon to question the responsibility of Moldova for
harm that occurred in an area of its territory over which it
no longer had effective control. The Court opined that
“States retain the obligation to use all means and re-
sources available to them to guarantee human rights”
(para 333) and upheld Moldova’s responsibility. Whilst en-
couraging states to make efforts to guarantee human
rights throughout its territory regardless of situations of
conflict is laudable, finding the state to have violated its
obligations in areas where it is no longer capable of secur-
ing human rights is questionable. Although the approach
of the Inter-American Commission may appear to be too
soft-handed, the much more heavy-handed approach of
the ECtHR has been questioned, not least by dissenting
judges (Illascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia 1999,
Partly Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza).
Ultimately, whichever view is taken could result in a
gap in human rights protection. Even if a state were to
use all means and resources available to try to secure
human rights in areas controlled by NSAGs, it may not
be possible. Additionally, and unfortunately, the vast ma-
jority of previous cases upholding indirect horizontaleffect have been in relation to civil and political rights. Until
recently, it was not possible to bring an individual com-
plaint in relation to rights contained in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.19 The
entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant
now allows for this possibility, but it remains to be seen
how the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights will deal with such situations.20 These factors all cul-
minate in a gap in effective legal protection of subsistence
rights during armed conflicts. Whilst some NSAGs take it
upon themselves to provide public services and to essen-
tially fulfil some human rights on a de facto basis, there ex-
ists a legal lacuna. A correlative of this is an inequality in
human rights protection. Victims living in an area con-
trolled by the state may still be able to receive redress for
their human rights violations by bringing a complaint dir-
ectly against the state. For those living in NSAG-controlled
areas, depending on the situation on the ground and the ef-
forts that states have made in securing human rights enjoy-
ment despite the control of the NSAG, this may not be
possible. Individuals suffering the effects of severe humani-
tarian crises may therefore be left with no way of accessing
essential materials. Despite laudable efforts by humanitarian
aid organisations to deliver materials to those in need, and
the humanitarian norms prohibiting the restriction of their
access to areas in need of essential materials,21 some areas
remain rife with crisis. For these reasons, more measures
need to be taken to try to achieve a rounder, more compre-
hensive protection of human rights.
This contrasts with international humanitarian law,
which contains the fundamental principle of equality of
obligations.22 This means that all parties to a conflict
owe the same obligations and hold the same rights “irre-
spective of the ‘justness’ of the cause”, even during
NIAC (Sivakumaran 2012, 242–246). Consequently, ci-
vilians belonging to both sides of the conflict are in the-
ory equally protected from the effects of the conflict.
However, the developments in the range of laws applic-
able during NIAC remains limited in comparison with
international armed conflicts due to the reasons men-
tioned above. The limited scope of the norms renders
the equality of obligations during NIAC less meaningful,
particularly in situations where the high threshold for
application of Additional Protocol II is not met. Indeed,
the equality of obligations in NIAC was seemingly a re-
sponse to the need to ensure equal protection for civil-
ians during internal as well as international conflicts
rather than to recognise NSAGs as bodies competent of
discharging obligations.
In this respect, it is possible to compare the applica-
tion of humanitarian law to NSAGs with that of human
rights norms to some extent. States have shown a reluc-
tance to impose direct obligations on non-state actors
under both spheres of law, resulting in the (deliberate)
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respect to both legal fields, the primary reason for this is
the prevailing state-centric, Westphalian approach to
international relations. States are still considered to be
the sole subjects of international law; sovereign entities
endowed with the power and responsibility of managing
their internal affairs (including the regulation of non-state
actors). This is reflected, for example, in the fact that only
states may be party to international human rights law
treaties and the Geneva Conventions (including Additional
Protocol II). Changes in the prevalence and power of
NSAGs are highlighting the insufficiency of this paradigm
for dealing with situations of humanitarian crisis during
NIAC. Interestingly, some level of equality has been trans-
posed into the younger field of international criminal law,
which allows for individuals to be held individually crimin-
ally responsible for breaches of international humanitarian
law. This is possible where an individual has committed
one of the ‘grave breaches’ of the norms, some of which
concern human rights principles.23 Nonetheless, the princi-
ples involved do not relate to subsistence rights. This makes
the deterrent aspect of international criminal law less valu-
able in the context of humanitarian crises. Consequently,
the gap in both humanitarian and human rights law makes
it difficult to govern the actions of NSAGs effectively.
Christa Rottensteiner has noted, “the primary respon-
sibility for meeting the needs of the civilian population
in an armed conflict rests with the warring parties that
are in effective control of the territory on which that
population lives” (Rottensteiner 1999). As the inter-
national legal framework does not currently envisage
NSAGs as obligation-holders, and in light of the lack of
evidence of political will to alter this, extra-legal efforts
are necessary to bring NSAGs’ conduct in line with hu-
man rights standards and alleviate humanitarian crises
caused by NIAC.
Methods for improving the governance of NSAGs
There have been numerous methods used to reduce the
human cost of non-international armed conflicts, many
of which also aim to more effectively govern the actions
of NSAGs. The measures range from reports condemning
the actions of the groups to voluntary undertakings by
groups promising to adhere to particular international
norms. The scope of the measures’ contents is also vari-
able, seemingly rendering specific examples more or less
relevant to the issue of improving the fulfilment of subsist-
ence rights during non-international armed conflicts.
However, the common aims of each measure (being to en-
gage with NSAGs and bring their conduct into compli-
ance with particular legal standards) make each example
discussed below relevant in the present context. Several
previous initiatives will now be assessed to determine the
likelihood of similar approaches being able to improve theprotection of subsistence rights during situations of hu-
manitarian crisis.
Voluntary undertakings
As can be seen on quite a widespread basis, NSAGs with
effective control over an area of territory sometimes volun-
tarily undertake some human rights obligations. Whether
the group itself views their actions in this way or not, there
are many which have, on a de facto basis, begun to fulfil
some human rights. These can range from the provision of
some public services to the instatement of an internal just-
ice system. This is often due to the group’s ultimate goal of
either taking complete control over a territory and becom-
ing the new governmental authority or establishing a sep-
arate, smaller state within the territory of the state that
they are in a conflict with. We can see examples of both of
these instances if we look at the so-called Islamic State and
the FARC, respectively. The mission of the Islamic State is
to take control over a very large territory within the Le-
vant, including Iraq and Syria (Australian National Secur-
ity Database on Terrorist Organisations 2014). Within a
relatively short period of time, the group gained effective
control over an area of Syrian territory, establishing a
‘capital’ known as Raqqa (Hubbard 2014). Having ob-
tained authority in this region, the Islamic State went on
to establish what is essentially a state-like structure
(Barnes-Dacey 2014). This has involved the group re-
securing the provision of some public services, for ex-
ample installing new power lines and setting up a ‘suq’
for locals to exchange goods, and reforming the educa-
tion system (see Zelin 2014). Whilst the intentions of
the group in doing these are most likely not related to
human rights concerns, it could be argued that they are
in effect providing some human rights to (at least some)
individuals within Raqqa. However, obvious problems
arise. There are concerns as to discrimination in the
provision of the public services, and the inability of the
Syrian state (or indeed of third states) to exercise con-
trol or influence over the group makes it virtually im-
possible for outside actors to improve the situation of
humanitarian crisis within Raqqa.
The situation regarding the FARC is somewhat differ-
ent. In 2000, the Colombian Government agreed to con-
cede around 42,000 km2 to the non-state group. Some
of the actions of the FARC within this area have been
surprisingly state-like, as the group “deliver[s] social ser-
vices, including healthcare and education. They also
practise restorative justice through their revolutionary
courts and have implemented agrarian reform by break-
ing up large ranches and turning over smaller plots to
landless peasants. They also collect taxes from local
businesses to fund schools and clinics” (Leech 2013).
This shows that the group has a very well-established
and fully functioning community, and the fact that they
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healthcare suggests that they are capable of and actually
are fulfilling these human rights within their controlled
territory.24 The successful governance of at least this
relatively large area by the FARC makes it not implaus-
ible that they would be able to orchestrate the required
infrastructure to achieve this on a larger scale, were their
armed forces be able to overtake a larger percentage of
land from the state.
Voluntary undertakings in this manner are a promising
development for subsistence rights. Many public services
entail the provision of economic, social and cultural rights,
such as healthcare. However, the nature of the undertak-
ings makes them very hard to regulate and monitor. The
lack of a concrete agreement or obligation means that the
NSAG providing the services may choose the extent to
which it wishes to provide a right. As with ISIS, this may
in turn lead to discrimination in the fulfilment of rights. It
is therefore desirable to have some form of agreement or
statement by the NSAG specifying the scope of the rights
and obligations they are willing to fulfil.
Action plans and deeds of commitment
There have been several initiatives taken by the United
Nations and various non-governmental organisations to
encourage NSAGs to adopt agreements specifying obli-
gations with which they agree to comply. Most of the
measures focus on humanitarian norms, rather than hu-
man rights law. This is logical, since NSAGs are subject
to some humanitarian obligations, but the lack of pres-
sure on groups to respect human rights norms dis-
tinctly from humanitarian norms could be a missed
opportunity. Two of the largest initiatives taken to bet-
ter govern the actions of NSAGs are the Security
Council action plans and lists of shame (within the
context of the recruitment and use of child soldiers)
and Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment. Lessons may
be learned from these two examples as to the likely
challenges to securing a human rights-specific under-
taking by NSAGs. Indeed, experiences with the action
plans and deeds of commitment can demonstrate
whether a solution to the problem at hand (securing
NSAGs’ compliance with subsistence rights to alleviate
humanitarian crises) may be found in these two
measures.
A. Action plans
Action plans were introduced after the General
Assembly’s Special Representative had identified six
“grave violations” towards children during armed
conflict. The plans are formed following Security
Council action in this context (see Office of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict 2009, 2).In 2001, the Security Council adopted a resolution
which urged the Secretary-General of the United
Nations to publish a list of all parties to armed
conflicts who were recruiting or using child soldiers
incompatibly with applicable obligations under
international law, and in relation to situations which
were, or could have been, on the agenda of the Security
Council (see United Nations Security Council 2001,
para 16). As a consequence, with the intention of
“naming and shaming” armed forces, the first ‘1379 list’
in 2002 contained 23 groups (Secretary General on
Children and Armed Conflict 2002, cited in Harvey
2003, 29–30). A further resolution now obliges to
provide reports to the Security Council on actions
taken to ameliorate the situation (United Nations
Security Council 2003, para 5, cited in Harvey
2003, 30).
A further initiative by the Security Council—the
‘Action Plan’ initiative—enables listed groups to have
their names removed from the list of shame. The
concept was developed in Security Council
Resolution 1460 (2003) and involves an agreement
between the listed group and the Security Council. If
appropriately implemented, this will result in the
removal of groups from the ‘list of shame’ (Office of
the Special Representative of the Secretary General
for Children and Armed Conflict 2015). This is a
positive development because it allows the NSAG to
have some level of negotiation with the United
Nations, which may prove to be crucial to the
ultimate goal of halting their use of child soldiers.
Rather than affording the groups legitimacy, the lists
make an example of the groups and place them on
the ‘naughty step’. In contrast, the action plans allow
the NSAG a certain degree of autonomy, almost an
initiation into the ‘adult’ world of international
subjects, enabling their participation and giving
them a chance to prove themselves, whilst
maintaining the ‘training wheels’ and the ability of
the Security Council to reign them in should they
fail to honour the agreement.25 Despite the positive
impact that the action plans can have, they are not
able (nor are they intended) to have a broader
impact on the enjoyment of human rights within an
area controlled by a NSAG. Therefore, whilst they
can contribute towards the governance of the
actions of NSAGs, their specificity prohibits them
from filling the governance gap in a more general
manner. If one takes a regulatory governance
approach (achieving effective governance through
complementary measures at the local, national and
international level, by a range of actors) (e.g. Levi-
Faur 2010, 13–14) to the issue of NSAGs, this is not
of itself a negative consequence, but it does point to
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of humanitarian crisis.
B. Deeds of commitment
Similar comments can be made in relation to
Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment. There are
three types of commitment, dealing with anti-
personnel mines, the protection of children from the
effects of armed conflict and the prohibition of
sexual violence and gender discrimination (see
Geneva Call 2014a, 2014b). The deed relating to the
protection of children has been a landmark
development within the global campaign against
child soldiers. The deed is the first international
instrument that NSAGs could voluntarily and
unilaterally sign and be judged upon their
implementation thereof. Nevertheless, they may
only have real value as a positive gesture. The deeds
have been instrumental in raising awareness and
encouraging NSAGs to consider the human rights
impacts of their actions more concretely. In
particular, the deed for the prohibition of sexual
violence and gender discrimination provides a
substantial list of commitments to which the groups
agree to adhere to. These include certain provisions
that would also fall under international human
rights law, such as a prohibition of discrimination
against women and equal access to healthcare
(Geneva Call 2013a, para 5). Additionally, the deed
does acknowledge that it is “one step or part of a
broader commitment” to human rights and
humanitarian law (Geneva Call 2013a, para 9).
Nonetheless, there is no direct reference to human
rights obligations of NSAGs.
In contrast, the deed on the protection of children
does mention human rights in its main provisions,
but restricts commitment to respect for the rights to
life, human dignity and development (Geneva Call
2013b, preamble).26 It is of course understandable
that Geneva Call refrained from including a fuller
range of human rights in the deed. Given the
worries of legitimising NSAGs by holding them to
the same international obligations as states during
armed conflicts (which has also contributed to the
fact that rules of non-international armed conflicts
are less expansive than those of international armed
conflicts) (Sivakumaran 2012, 68–77), concerns that
NSAGs do not have the capacity to fulfil human
rights obligations to the same extent as states (e.g.
Moir 2002, 194, cited in Clapham 2006a, 502) and
the aim of the deeds, the focus on humanitarian
norms is not misplaced. Nevertheless, as per the
approach taken by the Inter-American Court
(discussed above), which would read some economic,
social and cultural rights into the right to life, thedeeds could be interpreted to impose obligations on
NSAGs to contribute to the realisation of subsistence
rights. But even if the deeds were to be read as such,
two main problems ensue. On the one hand, the
commitment is to ‘respect’ the rights, which under
international human rights law is an obligation to
refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human
rights. Individuals in situations of humanitarian crisis,
however, require their rights to be fulfilled. This
obliges obligation-holders to (i) facilitate the
realisation of rights by taking “positive initiatives to
enable the full enjoyment” and (ii) provide “direct or
indirect state services when individuals or groups are
unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realise the
right themselves by the means at their disposal” (see
respectively, CESCR 1999a, para 15; CESCR 1999b,
para 6). This goes considerably beyond an obligation
to refrain from taking action and cannot legitimately
be read into a commitment to ‘respect’ rights. The
other problem is the non-binding nature of deeds and
the lack of any enforcement mechanism for them,
which may not result in concrete improvement of
victim’s right, and the link between the deed and
obligations of subsistence rights is a somewhat
tenuous basis for imposing a direct obligation on
NSAGs.
C. Outcomes of the initiatives
As has been indicated, the outcomes of these two
initiatives have not been as positive as one would
have hoped. Unfortunately, as the Security Council
noted in its Fifth Cross-Cutting Report, published in
2013, “there has been little movement in getting
non-state actors to agree to action plans” regarding
child soldiers, compared to more successful efforts
in relation to state forces (United Nations Security
Council 2012). Furthermore, as of 2011, less than
15 % of NSAGs using child soldiers had agreed to
one of the aforementioned action plans (see
Watchlist on Children in Armed Conflict 2011, 6);
although in recent years, there have been some
signings of the action plans and consequent
de-listing of NSAGs.27 This suggests that the action
plans are proving useful in the effort to regulate the
actions of NSAGs. The deeds of commitment
dealing with anti-personnel mines have received a
significant number of signatures, whilst the other
two deeds have received much fewer.28 Despite not
having a mechanism comparable to the removal of
groups from the list of shame, Geneva Call has been
extremely active in following up on deeds of
commitment. For example, they have provided
training for some NSAGs on how they can put their
commitments into practice (e.g. in Syria: Geneva
Call, 2014b), and they continue to monitor groups
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(Geneva Call 2015a). This is an important step in
being able to fulfil the deeds’ goals of holding
NSAGs publicly accountable for their actions
(Geneva Call 2015b). For a NSAG, signing a deed of
commitment is one step towards acknowledging
(albeit limited) international responsibility for its
actions. The deeds suggest that once engaged,
NSAGs are willing and capable of taking
commitments seriously. If groups are hoping to
establish themselves as a legitimate authority, it is
crucial for them to be seen to make a tangible effort
to abide by international obligations to which they
would be bound were they to succeed. This is all the
more important in light of the Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (International Law Commission 2001), according
to which an insurrection group that succeeds in
becoming the legitimate authority of a state may be
held, ex post facto, internationally responsible for any
breaches of international law that may be attributed
to it before it came into power (Article 10).
However, notwithstanding great expectations being
placed on United Nations action to combat the use
of child soldiers, reports show that the technique of
naming and shaming has not been successful.
Instead of decreasing the prevalence of child
soldiers, the most recent report by the Secretary-
General on children and armed conflict states that
there are currently 57 groups in 15 countries that
are recruiting or using child soldiers,29 17 of which
have remained on the list for 5 years or more
(Coomaraswarmy 2012, Annex 1). In contrast,
only five groups were ‘de-listed’ in the last year.30 In
addition, the prohibition of the recruitment and use
of child soldiers by NSAGs in Article 4 to the
Optional Protocol to the CRC does not afford as
effective protection as may be hoped. The lack of
monitoring or enforcement mechanisms within the
Protocol “inevitably will hinder” its effectiveness
(Abraham 2003, 17). This is particularly true in
relation to NSAGs, which unlike states are not subject
to external monitoring mechanisms (e.g. the Human
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review). This
strongly supports an argument that there need to be
supplementary measures taken in the area of human
rights; the current legal regimes, whether within
human rights law or in other areas of international
law and policy, are clearly not succeeding in their
goals.
In the context of the current problem, the action
plans and deeds may appear to be of limited value.
However, in terms of moving forwards, Andrew
Clapham has suggested extending the commitmentsto cover more detailed human rights abuses
(Clapham 2006b, 292–293). On a similar vein,
Solimon Santos has envisaged Geneva Call basing
these commitments on human rights in the future
(Santos 2002, cited in Clapham 2006b, 293). This
could indeed be useful in terms of improving some
NSAGs’ protection of subsistence rights during
humanitarian crises. A human rights-specific
commitment could include a provision that NSAGs
who are in an ongoing conflict (or conflicts) agree
that, should a situation of humanitarian crisis arise,
they will fulfil certain obligations relating to
subsistence rights (i.e. the minimum core). This
could go some way to rectifying the main problem
of using deeds to alleviate humanitarian crises—the
lengthy process involved in their adoption and
implementation. This approach would not be
relevant for many NIAC and would still require
methods capable of providing a much more
immediate response. A suggested method for this
will be submitted below.Common Article 3 special agreements
One example of such an agreement is a ‘special agreement’
adopted pursuant to Common Article 3 of the four
Geneva Conventions. As mentioned above, unless Add-
itional Protocol II applies, Common Article 3 is the only
treaty norm applicable to NIAC. The provision encour-
ages parties to NIAC to bring other provisions of the
Geneva Conventions into force through a special agree-
ment. The agreements may state the law that parties are
already bound to follow (declaratory agreements) or ex-
tend their legal obligations (constitutive agreements). Spe-
cial agreements constitute clear commitments by parties
to a conflict, providing an “important basis for followup
interventions to address violations of the law” (ICRC
2008, 16). The agreements can also potentially remedy the
gap between law and practice that exists in relation to
NIAC, and the application of more extensive norms can
ensure more equal protection of civilians during inter-
national and internal armed conflicts. Indeed, practice re-
lating to special agreements shows that most agreements
adopted involve those humanitarian norms concern the
protection of civilians (Clapham et al. 2015, 513). How-
ever, the agreements have not been particularly popular in
practice (Clapham et al. 2015, 511), and for the purposes
of protecting subsistence rights during humanitarian cri-
ses, they are fundamentally limited by their restrictive
scope of their coverage (i.e. the Geneva Conventions).
Nonetheless, lessons may be learned from the agreements
which have arguably been the inspiration for agreements
through which NSAGs assume both humanitarian and
human rights obligations, which will be discussed in the
following section.
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Other than the voluntary commitments by NSAGs, there
have also been examples of human rights agreements be-
tween NSAGs and states. Perhaps the most famous of
these is the human rights agreement concluded between
the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Naçional
(FMLN) and the government of El Salvador in 1990. The
Acuerdo de San José sobre Derechos Humanos 1990 in-
cluded provisions that the NSAGs would comply with the
same human rights obligations as the El Salvadorian sta-
te—a significant undertaking. The obligations of the
FMLN in relation to particular human rights, for example
the rights to freedom of association, expression and move-
ment, are elaborated upon within the agreement. Al-
though the more specific obligations relate more to civil
and political rights as opposed to economic, social and
cultural rights, the agreement was very significant for two
reasons. First, in terms of disregarding concerns of states
that giving NSAGs direct human rights obligations would
grant the groups unwelcome legitimacy31 and second in
the fact that the United Nations endorsed and agreed to
monitor implementation of the agreement.32 The recogni-
tion of the agreement’s preamble that the FMLN had the
capacity to fulfil the human rights obligations is also
worthy of note, especially given widespread opposition to
horizontal effect for this reason (Zegveld 2002).
Another example of a bilateral agreement including hu-
man rights norms is the Comprehensive Agreement on
Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitar-
ian Law between the National Democratic Front of the
Philippines and the Government of the Philippines 1998.
The Agreement included a whole section dedicated to an
impressive range of human rights.33 Although a laudable
effort and very much a positive development in itself, the
ensuing peace was not long-lasting. This rendered the
governance potential of the agreement effectively null,
with renewed efforts at reconciliation between the parties
repeatedly falling through.34 In addition, the agreements
would need to include specific provision for subsistence
rights in order to make sure that their protection during
humanitarian crises would be provided for. This may not
be a problem in itself, but the low likelihood of such a hu-
man rights agreement having been adopted before a situ-
ation of humanitarian crisis caused by a NIAC is more
problematic. Together with the rarity of states agreeing to
acknowledge the validity of declarations and agreements
of NSAGs, this suggests that a new approach is necessary.
Ceasefire agreements: an alternative solution?
Given the above shortcomings of previous initiatives, it
is submitted that a new approach must be taken to in-
crease the potential of human rights observance by
NSAGs during humanitarian crises. To avoid some of
the challenges faced by measures such as the deeds ofcommitment and more general human rights agree-
ments (e.g. engagement with NSAGs and state recogni-
tion of agreements), this approach should use an
existing measure that is already accepted by states and
NSAGs, in a new way. The measure proposed is the use
of ceasefire agreements between parties to a NIAC.
The nature and content of ceasefire agreements
The term ‘ceasefire agreement’ refers to an agreement
between two parties engaged in conflict with each other
to end hostilities. Ceasefire agreements may take several
forms, cover different scopes of content and durability
and have different purposes. For example, an agreement
may aim to establish peace through a complete cessation
of hostilities (also referred to as ‘peace agreements’).
Ceasefire agreements may also be made as a way of tem-
porarily ceasing hostilities in order to enable the parties
to a conflict to negotiate a full peace agreement. Alterna-
tively, a ceasefire agreement may be more limited in tem-
poral scope. Such agreements are often adopted for
humanitarian purposes, to allow civilians temporary relief
from hostilities in order to get access to essential materials
(such as those seen between Hamas and Israel).35
The recommendations of using ceasefire agreements
will focus on the latter type of agreement, rather than
peace agreements (and long-term ceasefire agreements).
The latter, although perhaps the most significant cease-
fire agreements when successfully implemented, are of
less relevance for present purposes. This is because al-
though some such agreements have been adopted in the
past (e.g. the Comprehensive Peace Accord between the
Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) 2006), they can take many years of nego-
tiation to come to fruition. Indeed, taking the example
of the Colombian government, which has been negotiating
various peace agreements with the FARC for decades, it is
evident that in some situations, a long-term ceasefire
agreement is extremely unlikely to be adopted. As the
problem faced in this paper is to provide a relatively fast
response to situations of humanitarian crisis, peace agree-
ments would not be the most effective solution.
In addition, it is important to note at this juncture the
legal status of peace agreements. Prior to 2005, peace
agreements were understood as being legally binding
documents, serving as a kind of contract between the
signatory parties (Kastner 2015, 13). Since the Armed
Activities Case before the ICJ (International Court of
Justice 2005), however, the status of peace agreements
has been in doubt. In this case, the Court effectively
‘downgraded’ the status of peace agreements from legally
binding instruments to modus operandi (para 99). The
reasoning for this seems to have been to prevent states
from relying on peace agreements to escape inter-
national responsibility for wrongful acts (an argument
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109). Andrea Lang has argued that the Court’s judge-
ment was also based on a reluctance to engage with the
issue of the status of NSAGs under international law
(Lang 2008, 125), which is an issue that would be un-
avoidable, should agreements signed by NSAGs constitute
a legally binding document. However, the legal status of
the kinds of ceasefire agreements between states and
NSAGs focused on in the current paper remains some-
what anomalous (see Kastner 2015, 13–14). Even though
many of these agreements do not fall within the realm of
public international law, it is still possible for a NSAG to
conclude a legally binding agreement with states (for ex-
ample by “including a third state party as a guarantor or
using a Security Council Resolution”: Public International
Law and Policy Group 2013, 7). The legal status of the
agreements proposed will therefore depend upon the situ-
ations of their adoption.
Ceasefire agreements generally consist of three core el-
ements, which provide for “(1) a cessation of hostilities,
(2) the separation of forces, and (3) the verification,
supervision, and monitoring of the agreement” (Public
International Law and Policy Group 2013, 1). A key
component to the success of ceasefire agreements is to
“clearly indicate the rights and obligations of the parties”
(ibid, 1–2). This component is of particular relevance
here, as it suggests that some level of detail concerning
the rights and obligations is required. This supports (in
light of the above discussion as to the relevant lex specia-
lis) an argument that human rights norms, rather than hu-
manitarian norms should be included in the agreement to
improve the protection of subsistence rights.
Ceasefire agreements as a tool for compliance
In using ceasefire agreements as a tool for NSAGs’ com-
pliance with human rights law to improve protection of
subsistence rights during humanitarian crises, it is envis-
aged that provisions detailing the relevant norms of hu-
man rights law and the standards expected to be upheld
by parties to the conflict will be included. The advan-
tages and disadvantages of this approach will now be
examined.
Advantages of using ceasefire agreements
One advantage of using ceasefire agreements concerns
the fact that their use is already widely accepted by both
states and NSAGs, reflected in the prevalence of their
adoption. In relation to the conflict in Myanmar alone, for
example, ceasefire agreements have been adopted between
the government and 14 non-state armed groups (Oo 2014,
7). In light of the reluctance of states to endorse NSAGs’
unilateral declarations or agree to Common Article 3 Spe-
cial Agreements (premised on a concern that to do so
would “grant a degree of legitimacy” upon the group:ICRC 2014, 17), the acceptance by both actors is ex-
tremely advantageous.
Including human rights obligations in ceasefire agree-
ments that are already being negotiated would also be less
resource-intensive and faster than the adoption of (for ex-
ample) a new agreement specifically for the imposition of
human rights obligations. In particular, short-term cease-
fire agreements may be used to place economic, social
and cultural rights obligations on NSAGs and states alike.
The kinds of obligations envisaged would admittedly de-
pend on the situation on the ground. For example, the
capacity of the NSAGs to fulfil obligations and the nature
of the humanitarian crisis would require careful consider-
ation. However, ceasefire agreements often include hu-
manitarian considerations relating to economic, social and
cultural rights (for example provisions relating to the de-
livery of aid).36 Making the human rights aspects of these
provisions explicit could be a reasonable way of placing
more direct human rights obligations on NSAGs in a pos-
ition to fulfil subsistence rights. This is especially true
given that there are already some ceasefire agreements
that include human rights-related provisions and work to-
wards the protection of international humanitarian law
and humanitarian aid (Reuters 2014). For example, the
agreement between the Government of Nepal and the
Communist Party of Nepal provides an expansive list of
human rights obligations for both parties, ranging from
the right to life and the prohibition of torture to the right
to food and the right to health. As such, including more
context-specific and detailed human rights obligations for
NSAGs in ceasefire agreements would not be an excessive
development.
Another advantage of using ceasefire agreements in
this way is that it could open the door to more human
rights agreements. Just as short-term ceasefire agree-
ments often pave the way to the adoption of a peace
agreement, they could form a stepping stone to more
agreements like that between El Salvador and the FMLN,
with a longer time span and more extensive human
rights protection.
In addition, the agreements would only affect the spe-
cific NSAG subject to the agreement. On the one hand,
this should mollify state concerns that more general hu-
man rights agreements for NSAGs would either grant
them legitimacy or move too far towards treating them
as subjects of international law. As such, the agreements
would not be as invasive into the international legal
framework as would a more general legally binding hu-
man rights instrument for NSAGs. On the other hand,
ceasefire agreements can include conflict-specific details.
This is crucial when dealing with different groups, their
mode of operations and the specific challenges faced in
trying to improve access to subsistence rights in a par-
ticular rebel-held area.
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the huge symbolic value that they would have. From the
perspective of NSAGs, they could be a way for them to
prove that they have both the willingness and capacity to
act as a state-like entity within the international arena.
Whether or not this is desirable from an objective per-
spective, the group may enhance its reputation both with
the individuals over which they exercise control and the
international community at large. They would, neverthe-
less, fall short of changing the groups’ status under inter-
national law. Since NSAGs already conclude ceasefire
agreements, no developments in the international legal
framework would be necessary.
Furthermore, and of great importance, the agreements
could result in less discriminatory protection of human
rights. Although victims of more even and fair protec-
tion of human rights would not be able to receive the
same redress for violations as they would against a state
(i.e. bringing a complaint before a human rights treaty
monitoring body or court), since many ceasefire agree-
ments are monitored by the United Nations (which
would ideally be the case here), it may be possible for
them to gain some redress. The type of redress available
would of course depend upon the provisions and cir-
cumstances under which the agreement is drafted and
the extent to which the parties would consent to be
monitored. The fact that the agreements require consent
from both parties would, however, increase the legitim-
acy of the obligations placed on the parties.37 Concerns
as to the (particularly procedural) legitimacy (Ryngaert
2010, 73) of direct human rights obligations for NSAGs
could be mitigated by the inclusion of the NSAG in the
drafting process and ultimately by their consent in the
adoption of the ceasefire agreement. This may also make
NSAGs more likely to observe the obligations to which
they commit themselves. Indeed, the importance of en-
gaging with non-state actors before requiring certain be-
haviour of them has been repeatedly stressed (see
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 2011,
cited in International Peace Institute 2012). The import-
ance of engagement is reflected through the work of
Geneva Call, which has “demonstrate[d] that construct-
ive engagement with [armed non-state actors] can be ef-
fective and can yield tangible benefits for the protection
of civilians” (Bongard 2013).
Finally, from the perspectives of states, the agreements
may be more palatable than the adoption of a more gen-
eral agreement imposing human rights obligations on
NSAGs. Indeed, in adopting an agreement, they could
be seen to be fulfilling their own due diligence obliga-
tions; adopting an agreement with a NSAG which would
compel the group to protect human rights within the
territory control could be considered a means of encour-
aging NSAGs to respect human rights. In this way,although the idea of acknowledging that NSAGs are cap-
able of fulfilling some human rights obligations may not
be attractive to states, doing so in a way which allows
the NSAG to be held accountable may actually work in
their favour.
Disadvantages of using ceasefire agreements
Whilst the inclusion of economic, social and cultural
rights obligations in ceasefire agreements has many ad-
vantages, they unfortunately also have some drawbacks.
Most of these relate not to the use of the agreements
per se, but to issues of their adoption and enforcement.
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage is the fragile nature
of ceasefire agreements. Practice shows that the rate of
violation of ceasefire agreements is very high. It is there-
fore likely that future agreements including human
rights obligations would also be breached. However,
there are techniques relating to the drafting and imple-
mentation of ceasefire agreements that can mitigate
these risks. It has been suggested, for example, that
drafting provisions within ceasefire agreements as pre-
cisely as possible (in terms of the obligations and geo-
graphical and temporal scope) can facilitate effective
implementation (Hayson and Hottinger 2004, 2). Effect-
ive implementation often relies on a monitoring mech-
anism for a ceasefire agreement, agreed to between all
parties (Hayson and Hottinger 2004, 6). Unfortunately,
such a mechanism would be less amenable for the short-
term ceasefire agreements in question. This constitutes a
disadvantage of their use related to their short-term na-
ture, which could prevent the agreements from having a
long-term impact on economic, social and cultural rights
realisation. Providing a long-term solution is not the
intention behind the suggestion, however. Instead (and
contrary to common ideas of seeing economic, social
and cultural rights as long-term goals to be achieved in
the future), one aim of the agreements is to place more
focus on the potential of economic, social and cultural
rights to contribute to solving very immediate problems.
A further disadvantage of the proposal is that although
ceasefire agreements and peace agreements have been
adopted between state and non-state groups in the
past,38 the addition of human rights provisions in the
agreements may perturb a NSAG. This will of course de-
pend on the individual group, their aims and motivation
and how important third party opinions are to them. A
group that seeks to establish itself as a new state, for ex-
ample, may be more willing to take on these typically
state obligations. This is evident from examples such as
the National Liberation Front of Algeria and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (Higgins 2004, 24–26).
Other groups who have an ideology less in line with the
established global political system (for example those
that operate outside of the legal regime and effectively
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consider such influences to be important (see Jo 2015). In
these cases, other initiatives would have to be contem-
plated. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the pro-
posed idea of including some human rights provisions in
ceasefire agreements is envisaged not as a panacea. Rather,
it is intended to supplement and complement existing ini-
tiatives, forming one part of a multi-faceted governance
solution.
The potential lack of political will of NSAGs and states
alike to adopt the kind of ceasefire agreement suggested
is a problem faced throughout the international human
rights system. For example, the will of states to ratify hu-
man rights treaties (especially relating to economic, so-
cial and cultural rights) has been a challenge since their
inception.39 In particular, moving from ratification as a
form of lip service to the implementation of concrete
human rights standards has been a constant challenge.
However, the potential to have the agreements moni-
tored by the United Nations, or perhaps by a different
external monitoring body (perhaps even Geneva Call),40
would prove instrumental in ensuring that the obliga-
tions are followed.
Conclusions
The above discussions aimed to outline a prevalent and
persistent challenge faced during non-international armed
conflicts. The humanitarian crises being suffered by so
many may be mitigated to some extent through the im-
position of (temporary) human rights obligations on
NSAGs. As well as remedying to a degree the inequality of
obligations and human rights protection, human rights
norms could be used to compliment and build upon hu-
manitarian obligations of all parties to non-international
armed conflicts. Current initiatives that have been taken
to try to alleviate the human cost of armed conflicts, in-
cluding action plans, the ‘list of shame’ and deeds of com-
mitment, have had some success in governing the
behaviour of NSAGs. Nonetheless, large lacunas exist.
This is particularly with regard to the ability of the initia-
tives to tackle human rights protection. For this reason, a
possible additional and complementary measure that
could be taken is to include some subsistence rights obli-
gations in short-term ceasefire agreements. This envisages
giving human rights a larger role in the governance of
NSAGs. Whilst not constituting a perfect solution, the
agreements could prove to be a way of ameliorating situa-
tions of humanitarian crisis without requiring an unrea-
sonable burden on the international community.
Endnotes
1As it is a non-governmental organisation, the defin-
ition of Geneva Call is not contained in a legally binding
document. However, it is very influential, given the vastexperience and work of the organisation in the field of
non-international armed conflicts and in relation to
NSAGs.
2‘Universal’ in the sense that each member state of the
UN has ratified the Geneva Conventions. See, e.g. ICRC
(2015).
3This doctrine holds that since the “‘parent’ state has
accepted a given rule of IHL”, the state may impose the
obligations upon its nationals, including those who take
up arms against the state or other nationals (Kleffner
2011, 445).
4That is, the argument that because individuals can be
held responsible under international criminal law for
war crimes, which consist of grave breaches of humani-
tarian law, they must therefore be obliged to comply
with humanitarian law (see Kleffner 2011, 449–451).
5Article 1, para. 1 APII requires that (alongside the ex-
istence of an armed conflict within the territory of a high
contracting party) non-state parties to a NIAC have “re-
sponsible command, exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.”
6See the list of inter-state vs. intra-state armed con-
flicts on the International Institute for Strategic Studies
(2014) Armed Conflict Database. https://acd.iiss.org/en/
conflicts?tags=CF582C41FE1847CF828694D51DE80C08.
%20Accessed%2030%20Nov%202014. Accessed 1 Dec 2014.
7Whether or not the rules are effective is another
question, which falls outside of the scope of this paper.
8For example, knowing how to translate the legal text
into operational policies, or determining the correct
scope and content of obligations.
9This is evidenced by the core principle of distinction,
allowing only the targeting of ‘military objectives’, but
allowing any such classified individual to be killed at any
time during the conflict, even when not directly partici-
pating. See Article 13(1) Additional Protocol II; Solis
2010, 251–257.
10Whether the killing on sight of an enemy soldier
would be classified as an ‘arbitrary’ execution falls out-
side the scope of this paper.
11For example, Common Article 3 to the four Geneva
Conventions provides for an absolute prohibition of tor-
ture, of which non-observance is considered a grave
breach of international humanitarian law. See, e.g. Article
130 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War.
12This is pursuant to the customary humanitarian rule
that prohibits “attacking, destroying, removing or ren-
dering useless objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population” (see ICRC 2015a, Rule 54).
13The obligation to fulfil forms part of the tripartite
typology of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil
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Shue and Asbjørn Eide as a way of giving content to
economic, social and cultural rights (see Shue 1980; Eide
1987, cited in de Schutter 2010, 242).
14Müller applies the criteria for limitations and dero-
gations to economic, social and cultural rights to be
found legitimate to situations of armed conflict, and
finds them to be met in very restricted circumstances
(see Müller 2009, 557–601).
15The concept of a minimum core of human rights was
introduced by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR), and stipulate a minimum stand-
ard, or ‘floor’ of fulfilment of rights which no state party
may fall below, regardless of the allowance in Article 2(1)
of ‘progressive realisation’ of the rights enshrined in
ICESCR. The Committee has also emphasised that the
minimum core constitutes an immediately realisable obli-
gation for state parties, which, once established, may not
be retrogressed from (see CESCR 1990, para 10).
16Article 2(1) requires states to “take steps… to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means”.
17The Committee stated that any retrogressive mea-
sures would “require the most careful consideration and
would need to be fully justified by reference to the total-
ity of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the
context of the full use of the maximum available re-
sources” (CESCR, 1990: para 9).
18This would allow an individual to “enforce his funda-
mental rights against another individual” (Van Dijk and
Van Hoof 1998, 23).
19Although the Covenants were adopted at the same
time, unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR was not accompan-
ied by an Optional Protocol providing the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with a mandate
and jurisdiction to hear individual complaints against
states for alleged violations of human rights obligations.
Despite this fact, there have been some possibilities of
bringing complaints directly in relation to economic, so-
cial and cultural rights prior to the Optional Protocol to
ICESCR, e.g. under the Additional Protocol to the
European Social Charter Providing for a System of
Collective Complaints 1995, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 Organization of African
Unity 1981) and the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and People's Rights 1998
(Organization of African Unity 1998).
20The Protocol entered into force on 5 May 2013
(United Nations Treaty Collection Database 2015).
21The ICRC has identified the main customary inter-
national law rule as requiring parties to a conflict to “…allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of hu-
manitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial
in character and conducted without any adverse distinc-
tion, subject to their right of control.” Basic norms re-
garding access to and protection foodstuffs, healthcare
and humanitarian personnel in relation to NIAC can be
found in Article 3(2) Geneva Conventions; Articles 9, 11
and 18 Additional Protocol II. A full explanation of the
norms in NIAC can be found at ICRC (2015b). Custom-
ary IHL, Rule 55. https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/
eng/docs/v1_rul_rule55. Accessed 24 September 2015.
22According to Lauterpacht, this is a fundamental
principle of international humanitarian law (Lauterpacht
1953, 206. Cited in Sivakumaran 2012, 242).
23The principle of individual criminal responsibility,
bringing individuals within the jurisdiction of the ICC,
can be found in Article 25 Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court 1998.
24The provision of other services by the FARC, such as
housing, appears to be limited to its members. Indeed,
the promise of a better standard of living is often cited
as an incentive for joining the FARC (e.g. Council on
Hemispheric Affairs 2010).
25The fact that the groups voluntarily choose and
undertake the commitments in the action plans allows
them to assume responsibility for their actions at an
international level. This brings them one (small) step
closer to experiencing the international law-making and
responsibility of states.
26The fact that these commitments are only men-
tioned in the preamble, rather than the substantive pro-
visions, reduces their potential influence.
27So far seventeen groups have signed the action plans
(twelve of which were NSAGs) with only five having been
de-listed (see Office of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 2015).
28For a list of which groups have signed which deeds, see
Geneva Call (2015a) Action plans with armed forces and
armed groups. http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/
armed-non-state-actors/. Accessed 28 November 2014.
29The lists have been extended to include groups who
show “patterns of killing or maiming children”, “patterns
of committing sexual violence against children” (both
mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1882
(2009), cited in Office of the Special Representative of
the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict
2015) and “recurrent attacks or threats of attacks on
schools and hospitals, as well as on protected persons in
relation to schools and hospitals” (UN Security Council
Resolution 1998 (2011), cited in Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Children and
Armed Conflict 2015).
30‘De-listing’ refers to the removal of a party’s name
from the ‘list of shame’ pursuant to entering into one of
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ity Council (see Office of the Special Representative of the
Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict 2015).
31Through consenting to the agreement and acknowledg-
ing the fact that the FLMN has the capacity to fulfil the ob-
ligations (see Zegveld 2002, 51). This concern is often at
the forefront of states’ minds in the context of direct hori-
zontal effect (see Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012, 108).
32A UN peacekeeping operation (ONUSAL) was estab-
lished to monitor the agreement’s implementation. Infor-
mation on ONUSAL is available via the United Nations’
Peacekeeping website. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/past/onusalbackgr2.html. Accessed 1 December
2014.
33Part III of the agreement deals with ‘Respect for Human
Rights’, including a list of 25 human rights to be included.
34For a summarised timeline of the conflict between the
Government of the Philippines and (amongst other
NSAGs) the National Democratic Front of the Philippines,
see Project Ploughshares 2015).
35Noting in particular a 72-hour ceasefire agreement
adopted between the parties with the aid of Egypt, in
August 2014 (see Burke and Kingsley 2014).
36For example, a local ceasefire agreement adopted in
Damascus (Reuters 2014).
37The argument here is that “international norms that
affect non-state actors […] are in need of the latter’s par-
ticipation in order to be legitimate” (Ryngaert 2010, 73).
38In Burma, for example, a group of ‘ceasefire groups’
emerged after the signing of several agreements between
state and NSAGs (see Human Rights Watch 2007, 95).
39In relation to economic, social and cultural rights, this
is evident in the fact that despite its adoption in 1966, the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights did not enter into force
until 2013 (UN Treaty Collection Database 2015).
40Geneva Call’s experience in engaging with NSAGs
and monitoring the implementation of deeds of commit-
ment could prove invaluable in both the drafting and
supervision of the ceasefire agreements suggested.
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